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In many peripheral countries, remittances are becoming an extremely 
important source of external financial flows. In spite of their several desirable 
effects (e.g. structural growth, stability over time, direct positive impact on 
poor and middle-income families, etc.), remittances are hardly used for 
investment and productive purposes; rather they tend to prompt temporary 
consumption and even imports, exacerbating the trade deficit. In this paper, it 
is investigated how Microcredit Financial Institutions (MFIs) could connect to 
remittances flows, so as to boost self-reliance and entrepreneurship, thereby 
contributing to poverty reduction and widely shared economic growth. A 
policy trying to channel remittances to microcredit is evaluated in terms of its 
differentiated appeal for different kinds of migrants.  A world-wide analysis of 
remittances and microcredit diffusion is mapped into a graph of the 
hierarchical structure of the world, based on previous original works on core, 
peripheral, semi-peripheral, and independent countries. The results show that 
remittances significantly deviate from the pattern of both trade revenues and 
foreign direct investments. Remittances are shaking the world structure by 
arriving where the others do not. Quite similarly, the number of MFIs is 
higher the lower the ranking in the world hierarchy. In particular, the 
exceptional position of Bangladesh in both remittances and microcredit is 
paralleled by its almost unique position in the world hierarchy. In 
microeconomic terms, remittances are characterised by asymmetric 
information and moral hazard, which reduces their amount and the share sent 
through official channels. MFIs could boost overall remittances and take a 
share in them by offering innovative quadrilateral relations to remittance 
sender, remittance receiver, micro-loan borrower. Indeed, there is a high level 
of compatibility between microcredit and remittances mechanisms in terms of 
the people involved, the centrality of private initiative, the dimension of the 
transaction, the time horizon. In particular, there exists a small but growing 
sub-group of emigrants that could devote significant sums to fund MFIs in the 
perspective of receiving back the capital with interests when they come back 
(or go) to the developing country. The legal, risk-bound, competitor-driven 
problems of the proposed mechanism of connection are given remedies and an 
outline of time-path for implementation. In macroeconomic terms, the wider 
and more flexible aggregate supply due to the private entrepreneurial activities 
                                                          
1 This paper is the sole responsibility of the authors. The respective institutions are not 
responsible for any statement. We gratefully acknowledge the comments by Emanuele 
Rosemberg (banker) and Daniele Frigeri (remittance researcher). 
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funded by MFIs would increase the potential GDP and would improve the 
working of the Keynesian multiplier triggered by remittances, thus reducing 
inflationary tensions and trade unbalances. A more equilibrated and fairer 
growth path can then be attained. 
 
The countries where this proposed policy has the largest potential for success 
might include not only India, Bangladesh, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Thailand and 
Sri Lanka but also Ethiopia, Nigeria and the Philippines. Among the countries 
dominated by Germany, Egypt, Morocco, Viet Nam, Colombia and Mexico 
are particularly well placed to grasp this opportunity, especially if an adequate 






In the world debate on development and finance, two phenomena have seen a 
burgeoning interest in the latest years: remittances (see for instance WB 2006; 
DFID, 2003; Görlich et al., 2006; Rapoport and Docquier, 2005; Ratha and 
Riedberg, 2005; Solimano, 2004; Ratha, 2003; DeSipio, 2000) and microcredit 
(Yunus, 1998; Yunus, 2006; Harris, 2006; IOE, 2006). Both have been 
identified as promising venues for poverty eradication (Adams, 2006; 
Chowdhury, 2004; Gandhy and Marsh, 2003).  
 
Remittances, however, have been critically assessed as mainly directed 
towards consumption (e.g. Kapur D., 2003, p.18) and housing market 
(possibly provoking a price bubble), with a potential crowding out effect of 
domestic production, via exchange rate appreciation (ibid., p.20; Lopez H., 
Molina L. and Bussolo M., 2007, p.2) and imports (Kireyev A., 2006). 
Microcredit, which targets the poorest people in each country, allowing a new 
wave of strengthened private entrepreneurship (European Commission Report, 
2003, p.42) could be the channel through which a share of total remittances 
might be directed towards investments (Sander C, 2003, p.14; and Hertlein S. 
and Vadean F, 2006, p.6). 
 
The wide debate on both issues has not yet been reflected into a systematic 
review of how to match them to each other2. Although policy-makers have 
increasingly highlighted this perspective3, there are only few theoretical 
papers that cover the possibility that microcredit institution could be active (in 
one way or another) in the remittances flow management (Hastings, 2006; 
Sukadi, 2006; Azad, 2004; Siddiqi and Arbar, 2001, Inter-American 
Development Bank Multilateral Investment Fund, 2007).  
 
In this paper, we explore one of the most promising venues for making 
remittances working for the poor: the possibility that remittance senders “opt 
to open a savings account and deposit a portion of their transfer into that 
account, thereby increasing the volume of savings held by the MFI” (Hastings, 
2006, p. 12) to boost credit available to the poor and their private business 
initiatives. 
 
In some contribution, Microcredit Financial Institutions (MFIs) are seen as 
potential competitors to the money transfer agencies and other remittance 
intermediaries; in this paper, we shall assume the somewhat more conservative 
stance that consider MFI as target of remittance flows channeled by any 
remittance intermediary. Although this might be easier if the MFI acted as a 
sub-agent of the money transfer agencies, we consider this hypothesis 
unnecessary to our argument. 
 
                                                          
2 As a hint, in 2005, the 64-pages long report of the State of the Microcredit Summit 
Campaign devoted to remittances only three lines of text (p. 22). In 2006, just one line (p. 13). 
3 See for instance Narube, 2005. 
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Some recently released wide empirical datasets will allow a quantitative 
analysis, led by a highly structured macro-vision of the world, proposed by 
one of the authors (Piana 2004, Piana 2006), presented at the Princeton 
Conference on “Observing Trade”, which has already been quoted in other 
contexts (Malashevskaya, 2005). Policy implications will be sketched by 
presenting some institutional details about how and where this connection 
could work. 
 
The paper is organised as follows: the unifying framework of the hierarchical 
structure of the world is briefly presented in chapter 2; remittances are 
analysed both along the structure and in their micro-foundations in chapter 3; 
microcredit institutions and their basic success factors are presented, mapped 
in the world structure, and compared with remittance mechanisms in chapter 
4; a long discussion of how MFIS could be financed through a share of 
remittances takes place in chapter 5, where the expected sensitivity of different 
kind of emigrants and priority countries are evaluated; concluding remarks are 
contained in chapter 6.  
 
2. The structure of the world 
 
Regionalisation of the world along one-dimensional scale (e.g. by per-capita 
GDP) is a frequent device to try to depict world trends and structures. 
However, in so doing, one misses the influences that each country receives 
and exerts on the others, which in turn expresses the balance of strength in 
international relations. Since underdevelopment and poverty are not just the 
result of supposedly objective factors (resource endowment, climate, etc.) but 
represent the historical burden of ways of economic and political domination, 
it’s important - to understand if and how remittances and microcredit may 
structurally help developing countries and their poorest inhabitants - to project 
flows and results over a “world map” showing the network of interrelations 
that link the countries with each other and with a possibility of even changing 
this world order.  
 
This is useful also for policymaker in powerful countries to select certain 
nations where pressure can be exerted - e.g. for prompting changes in 
legislation (which have been signalled as one of the problems with connecting 
microcredit to remittances). 
 
Piana (2004) proposes a network approach, embedded in the social network 
analysis strand of research4, strictly based on empirical data5 and an 
exhaustive classification of 16 different types of interrelationships, in order to 
appreciate the wide potential variety of linkages6. The list is presented in the 
                                                          
4 See for instance Granovetter (1983), Albert and Barabasi (2002). 
5 The main dataset used is about bilateral merchandise trade, United Nations COMTRADE, 
2006. 
6 Policies aimed at changing the structure of the world, as defined in this perspective, have 
already been proposed, such as bilateral import promotion (Piana, 2006b) and international 
proximity trade (Piana, 2006c). 
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chapter 3.2. and the methodology is summarised in the Appendix 1. Here 
suffice to introduce the graph of one important relation: “integration” - which 
is characterised by a strategic parity / co-operation on “equal-foot” between 
the two partners789: 
 
Europe emerges as the main area where integration relations are more frequent 
(12 out of 24) but also the NAFTA triangle and the new Asian connection are 
clearly visible. Latin America has two embryos of integration, not connected 
to each other. The Arab world and Africa exhibit no example of integration. 
 
If the USA is the country with the largest number of integration relations (5), 
Germany just follows with 4, as France, but more than Japan, China or UK. 
 
The integration relation is really a precious one, not only because it engenders 
a horizontal structure in the world, but also because is quite rare (24 relations 
out of 4465). 
 
The asymmetric relation in which one country dominates the other in strong 
terms, “Dominance”10 is the most frequent (non-absent) relation11 and its 
graph is the following12: 
                                                          
7 Integration can be loosely defined as a situation were the two partners are very important to 
each other. 
8 Structure defined from data in 2003. 95 countries included in the analysis. Further data might 
be used for the updated version of this paper, if the paper is accepted for the PEGNet 
conference. 
9 Software packages used for this graph: Pajek and Ucinet, 2006. 
10 Dominance can be loosely defined as a situation where one partner A is essential to another 




Three layers are distinguishable:  
 
1. the core at the top, dominating without being dominated; 
2. the periphery at the bottom, dominated without exerting dominance; 
3. the semi-periphery in the intermediate area, constituted by country that 
dominates others while being in turn dominated13. 
 
In terms of the world regions, in 2003 the core of the world economy system 
was made up by 6 countries: the US, Germany, France, Belgium14, Japan, and 
China. 
 
While being “free” from the rest of the world, they all exerted a direct 
domination over most of the other countries, sometimes alone and sometimes 
in a sort of co-dominion of two (or more) “dominators”. 
 
The semi-periphery comprehended 27 countries. In the Americas, it included 
Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico; in Europe Austria, Belarus, Denmark, 
Finland, Greece, Italy, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, 
                                                                                                                                                         
11 Dominance characterises 219 relations, whereas absence of (major) linkages is exhibited in 
3865 dyads. 
12 Again we are using here empirical data for 2003 (95 countries). 
13 For exact attribution of a country to a world region, see Appendix II.  
14 Considered together with Luxembourg. 
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Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom; in the other continents Australia, India, 
Iran, Malaysia, Rep. of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa.  
 
The other countries constitute the periphery of the world system, being 
dependent at least on one of the countries in the core or in the semi-
periphery15.  
 
The unique countries that turn out to be - in this empirically-based analysis - 
not involved in any (strong) dependence relationship, thus constituting a 
region that might be called “Independence”, are Bangladesh and Uganda. As 
we shall see later on, Bangladesh has used this structural freedom to become 
an exceptional case for both microcredit and remittances flows. 
 
In what follows, we shall analyse the remittances flows in the four world 
regions (chapter 3.1) as well as along the kind of bilateral relationships 
(chapter 3.2). Then the distribution of MFIS will be studied across the four 
world regions (chapter 4.1); finally the matching between the two will be 
investigated (chapter 5.4). 
 
3.  The remittances flows 
 
Migrant remittances are defined broadly as the monetary transfers that a 
migrant makes to the country of origin16. They have emerged as an important 
source of external finance for development in recent years. According to the 
World Bank’s Global Economic Partnership’s (GEP) 2006 report, worldwide 
migrant remittances in 2005 exceeded $232 billion of which $167 billion 
constitutes those directed towards developing countries, an increase of about 
80% from 200317. Top 4 receivers, India, China, Mexico and France (in order 
of importance), received a third of global remittances18.   
 
Remittances remain the second largest financial flow to developing countries 
after foreign direct investment (FDI), and are more than double the size of net 
official development assistance. In particular, in 2005 the flows of remittances 
significantly exceeded aid flow ($ 106.5 billion) and were only second to FDI 
($ 237.5 billion)19. Remittances can be motivated by altruism, self-interest 
and insurance (Carling, 2005), since rational and emotional reasons are 
inextricably intertwined, as remittances are usually directed to relatives.  
 
Their flows also vary depending on skill and gender of migrants. In some 
countries, unskilled workers and women tend to remit more regularly and a 
larger share of income to their families than other demographic groups.  
                                                          
15 For the list of the allocation of all countries see the Appendix II. 
16 For purposes of this paper, we use the International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
definition. 
17 All figures do not include the large share of remittances that is transferred through informal 
channels and therefore goes unrecorded. 
18 UN-HABITAT, Migration – Remittances: Facts & Figures, 2006 
19 World Bank, Global Development Finance, 2006. 
 8
 
Remittances have multiple effects. They can have a positive effect on 
macroeconomic growth, poverty alleviation and human development to the 
extent that they are used to finance education and health care of the recipients 
and to generate employment among the poorest members of their community. 
However, they also increase inequality, encourage the consumption of 
imported food and create dependency among recipients. They serve as a 
critical source of foreign exchange but can also result in national currency 
appreciation, which, in turn, can affect the competitiveness of exports. 
Furthermore, heavy reliance on remittances makes a country economically 
vulnerable as other forms of dependence do (aid, trade in commodities, 
foreign investments and external debt). 
 
As Koc and Onan, 2001, noted, “for the most part, remittances are used for 
daily expenses such as food, clothing, and health care -basic subsistence 
needs- and they make up a significant portion of the income of those 
households. Funds also are spent on building or improving housing, buying 
land or cattle, and buying consumer goods such as washing machines and 
televisions. Generally, only a small percentage of remittances are spent on 
savings and what is termed "productive investment” (e.g., income and 
employment generating activities such as buying land or tools, starting a 
business, and other activities with multiple effects). Some criticise migrants’ 
use of remittances for focusing only on short-term consumption needs (which 
increases the demand for imports) and not enough on savings or "productive 
investments...Other... researchers also feel that these criticisms ignore the 
private nature of the transfers and the limited opportunities for small-scale 
investment in the community (regardless of the presence of remittances) and 
the social and financial capital needed for a new business. Given the 
circumstances in the various countries (e.g. lack of access to credit, poor 
infrastructure, etc.), the migrants are making rational decisions about the use 
of their remittances when making stable investments like the purchase of cattle 
or home improvements or when buying consumer goods that have local 
multiplier effects, such as increased demand and decreased unemployment”. 
In macroeconomic terms, remittances transferred to poorer countries generally 
represent a very stable flow of income. Beyond their positive effect on 
consumption and their potentially long-term development impact, two other 
characteristics enhance the value of remittances, namely, they are largely 
unaffected by political or financial crises and violent conflicts, even tending to 
increase in times of hardship and secondly they are more equally spread 
among developing countries than other capital flows.  
 
The real assets cumulated thanks to remittances (e.g. houses) are quite 
different from those built up because of Foreign Direct Investments (e.g. 
industrial plants) or Official Development Assistance (e.g. infrastructure), so 





3.1. Remittances in world regions 
 
How many remittances are flowing into the world regions? What is the source 
and which is the main target of remittances? These questions have been 
debated in terms of the growing importance of South-South remittances (Ratha 
and Shaw, 2007). In terms of our categories, in a set of 90 countries for which 
we have both remittances data and world region attribution20, the total flows 
in 2003 are the following: 
 
 Absolute value (USD) Percentage 








Semi-periphery 69,734,000,000 38% 




Source: Our elaboration on World Bank, Dataset for Global Economic 
Prospects (GEP), 2006. 
 
For comparison, revenue from trade in the same countries - again in 2003 - has 
the following structure: 
 
 Absolute value (USD) Percentage 





Core 3,115,798,213,035 44.8% 
Semi-periphery 2,239,891,749,803 32.2% 
Periphery 1,585,365,292,094 22,8% 
Independence 8,279,796,592 0.1% 
Source: Our elaboration on World Bank, Dataset for Global Economic 
Prospects (GEP), 2006. 
 
The periphery is much more present in percentage in inflows of remittances 
than in exports’ revenues. For periphery, remittances represent up to 4.1% of 
exports’ revenues, whereas in the core only the 1.4% and in semi-periphery 
3.1%. Remittances are asymmetrically more important for the periphery of the 
world than for the core.  
 
Independence exhibits an outstanding 42%. 




                                                          
20 Data and attribution both relate to 2003. Attribution found in Piana (2006). 
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 Absolute value (USD) Percentage 
World inflows of FDI  424,711,000,000 100% 
Core 178,933,000,000 42.1% 
Semi-periphery 141,527,000,000 33.3% 
Periphery 103,847,000,000 24.5% 
Independence 404,000,000 0.1% 
Source: Our elaboration on UNCTAD (2007). 
 
The distribution of FDI is much more similar to trade than to remittances, 
which conversely means that remittances are shaking the world structure by 
arriving where the others don’t. For instance, in 2003, remittances were higher 
than Foreign Direct Investment in 66 out of 154 countries where data are 
available. In the smaller sample where also the world region is available, FDI 
are smaller than remittances in 33 countries out of 90. In particular, this 
happens in the 100% of Independence region, in 41% (25 out of 60) of the 
Periphery, in 27% (6 out of 22) if semi-periphery, 0% in the core. The relative 
importance of remittances to FDI is thus particularly relevant the lower the 
ranking in the world hierarchy. 
 
In 95 countries for which Ratha and Shaw, 2006, provides bilateral data and 
the world region is available the data are the following: 
 
 Sender region 
Receiving region CORE SEMI-PERIPHERY PERIPHERY INDEPENDENCE World 
 
CORE 17,019 14,710 8,413 1 40,144 
SEMI-PERIPHERY 44,396 20,577 11,426 828 77,227 
PERIPHERY 36,518 28,030 8,975 20 73,543 
INDEPENDENCE 535 3,736 247 0 4,518 
World 98,468 67,053 29,061 849 195,432 
Source: Our elaboration on World Bank (2007). 
 
In net terms, the core is a net sender (58,324), while all the other regions are  
net recipients21. 
Source: Our elaboration on World Bank (2007). 
                                                          
21 Note that totals are different from the previous chapter because now 95 countries are 
considered, not just 90; the source of data is also different. 
22 From the point of view of recipient. 
Net values22 Sender region 
Receiving region CORE SEMI-PERIPHERY PERIPHERY INDEPENDENCE
CORE 0 -29,686 -28,104 -534 
SEMI-PERIPHERY 29,686 0 -16,604 -2,908 
PERIPHERY 28,104 16,604 0 -227 
INDEPENDENCE 534 2,908 227 0 
 58,324 -10,173 -44,482 -3,669 
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The flows in percentage are the following: 
 
 Sender region 
Receiving region CORE SEMI-PERIPHERY PERIPHERY INDEPENDENCE
CORE 8.7% 7.5% 4.3% 0.0% 
SEMI-PERIPHERY 22.7% 10.5% 5.8% 0.4% 
PERIPHERY 18.7% 14.3% 4.6% 0.0% 
INDEPENDENCE 0.3% 1.9% 0.1% 0.0% 
Source: Our elaboration on World Bank (2007). 
 
The largest flow of remittances is from core to semi-periphery, with core 
sending more to it than to periphery. This relation is inverted in the flows 
exiting the semi-periphery, because they are more directed to periphery than 
internally to semi-periphery.  
 
There exist non trivial remittances flows from periphery to core (4.3% to be 
thus subtracted from the 18.7% that the periphery receives from the core) and 
to semi-periphery (5.8% to be subtracted from 14.3%).  
 
Net flows (inflows less outflows) show that the largest net sender to periphery 
is the core. However, the semi-periphery empirically demonstrates its role of 
re-distributor: it is a net receiver from the core and a net sender to the 
periphery, which in turn is net receiver from both core and semi-periphery. 
 
The full picture of net flows in percentage over world totals is the following: 
 
 Sender region 
Receiving region CORE SEMI-
PERIPHERY 
PERIPHERY INDEPENDENCE
CORE 0.0% -15.2% -14.4% -0.3% 
SEMI-PERIPHERY 15.2% 0.0% -8.5% -1.5% 
PERIPHERY 14.4% 8.5% 0.0% -0.1% 
INDEPENDENCE 0.3% 1.5% 0.1% 0.0% 
Source: Our elaboration on World Bank (2007). 
 
This matrix shows the reciprocal net flows that all regions in the world 
provide to each other. 
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3.2. Remittances flowing through bilateral relationships 
 
In the previous chapter, the analysis was conducted in an aggregated way for 
regions defined by one specific kind of relationship (dominance). But the 
world structure is much more complex and it’s important to look at bilateral 
flows of remittances by each kind of relation. 
 
Based on bilateral trade, the list of the 16 types is shown in the following 
table23: 
 
Name Qualitative description Examples24 
Absence of 
relationships 
The countries "ignore" each other Australia-Andorra 




B is an important market for A Denmark-USA; Viet Nam-
USA 
Dependence B is very important to A, but the reverse is 
not true 
Philippines-USA; India-UK




Source integration They both need each other as providers No real world example in 
1998 or in 2003 
Mono out-integration One flow is important for both: the exports 
of A to B 
Saudi Arabia-Rep. of 
Korea;  Estonia-Latvia 
Dependent source 
interconnection 
A depends on B, but B needs A only as a 
source of supply 
Australia-Japan; Indonesia-
Japan 
Destination dominance A is an important destination for B, while A 
can ignore B 
Peru-Bolivia; Australia-
Viet Nam 
Mono in-integration One flow is important for both: the exports 
from B to A 
Republic of Korea-
Australia; Peru-Colombia 
Destination integration They both need each other as exporters Poland-Czech Republic25 
Dependent destination 
interconnection 










A is very important to B but A needs B only 





A is very important to B but A needs B only 
as a destination 
Spain-Portugal; United 
Kingdom-Ireland 
Integration They need each other on an equal foot. France-Germany; 
Argentina-Brazil 
 
                                                          
23 For the methodology used, see Appendix I and Piana (2006). 
24 The couples are ordered: the relationship is referred to the first of them. We chose 
relationships holding for both 1998 and 2003, unless otherwise stated. 
25 Only in 2003. In 1998 there are no examples of this pattern. 
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The outflows due to remittances and trade passing through these relationships 
are presented in the following table, with relations ordered by number of 
empirical occurrences in 20032627: 
 






3865 43,865,980,000 1,261,033,172,484 3.5% 
Dependence 219 12,739,280,000 830,116,246,049 1.5% 
Dominance 219 54,233,870,000 971,489,386,924 5.6% 
Source 
dependence 
166 3,838,170,000 223,034,612,029 1.7% 
Source 
dominance 
166 15,230,290,000 149,401,933,070 10.2% 
Destination 
dependence 
162 2,528,690,000 172,248,814,205 1.5% 
Destination 
dominance 
162 10,998,080,000 314,318,713,741 3.5% 
Integration 24 42,048,730,000 2,091,877,498,087 2.0% 
Mono out-
integration 
12  314,710,000 13,031,907,494 2.4% 
Mono in-
integration 












7 371,620,000 85,162,058,190 0.4% 
Dominant source 
interconnection 
7 747,360,000 128,755,119,678 0.6% 
Destination 
integration 
1 44,870,000 4,430,492,139 1.0% 
Source 
integration 
0 0 0 -- 
Total 4465 195,432,170,000 6,564,947,314,512 3.0% 
 
Remittances are flowing particularly strongly along dominance relationships 
to the dominated country, both in absolute terms (dominance is Top 1 relation) 
                                                          
26 Since we are interested in comparing how much is flowing from one country A to another 
country B, the trade flow to be compared with remittances from A to B is the payment for 
imports of A from B.  
27 95 countries included in the analysis. 
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and in percentage on trade (5.6% instead of the average 3%). Also the two 
weak dominance relations are providing remittances more than proportionally 
(10.2% and 3.5%). 
 
Remittances are systemic countervailing factor to trade domination, helping 
reducing the pressure exerted by hegemonic powers.  
 
However, they are proportionally weaker in equal-foot integration (2%), 
where their large absolute value (Top 3) is shadowed by the huge amount of 
trade involved in this symmetric privileged linkage. 
 
At the same time, remittances are high among countries which have in trade 
terms only minor links (“Absence of relation”): in absolute terms this relation 
is Top 2 and above percentage average (3.5%). Countries kindly ignoring each 
other in terms of trade would better talk about remittances. 
 
Metaphorically speaking, if trade is the skeleton of world economy, FDI could 
be seen as the muscles that make the skeleton moving; remittances might be 
represented as the fatty parts that reshape the world silhouette. 
 
3.3. The private micro-foundation of remittances 
 
To understand and influence remittances, heavily linked to family relations 
between the sender and the recipient(s) as they are, arguments from 
economics, sociology and psychology should be used together. A basic case is 
a spouse who leaves the family to go earning abroad; being the main rational 
reason for emigration, remittances are reliable, relatively frequent and large, 
provided the emigrant can reach some success in the labour market. At the 
same time, the much wider emotional links are put under stress by the distance 
and lack of presence, protection, and partnership. 
 
The distance (in physical and cultural terms) between the two countries makes 
this relationship burdened with asymmetric information and moral hazard. 
 
The sender does not know how the money is used, with recipients potentially 
diverting it to mere ephemeral expenditure (e.g. lotteries) and whether the 
recipient is developing alternative emotional relationships which might 
compensate the lack of everyday life and support. The recipient, in turn, does 
not know the level of sender’s income and the price level faced in the foreign 
country, thus cannot evaluate (and psychologically remunerate) how many 
sacrifices and efforts these remittances represent to the sender.  
 
For instance, the recent emigrant might be tempted to overstate labour success 
to demonstrate that the possibly contested choice of emigration was the right 
one, but then the remittances might not correspond to the level expected by the 
recipient. In another vein, the recipient cannot easily interpret sudden 
interruption of flows, whether they are due to hardships or to new emotional 
relationship in the new country. 
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This makes in some cases the return to home a potential explosive mixture of 
mismatching expectations, where the “monetisation of feelings” (that 
remittances to some extend constitute) might be accounted for very differently 
by the two parts. 
 
Characterised by asymmetric information and moral hazard, this setting 
reduces the overall amount of remittances as well as the share sent regularly 
through official channels, because informal channels like personal return or 
friends are much more conducive to a flow of crucial pieces of information.  
  
In other terms, remittances are an extremely sensitive subject because they 
incorporate private information and feelings. Trust, reciprocal control and 
extensive informational texture might be nurtured by third-parties maintaining 
proximity as the microcredit institutions. 
 
4. Microcredit institutions 
 
The Microcredit Summit, an annual event held since 1997, defines microcredit 
as “programs that provide credit for self-employment and other financial and 
business services (including savings and technical assistance) to very poor 
persons”28. While the practice of microcredit lending was developed 
independently around the world in the 1970s, the largest and most acclaimed 
microcredit institution is the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, winner, together 
with its founder Mohammed Yunus, of the 2006 Nobel Prize. 
In developing countries, poverty and dwindling economic growth have made 
the large part of their population to be engaged in self-employment and in the 
informal activities. Developing their indigenous private sector to participate in 
(and lead) future growth is a crucial task for both the private sectors and 
governments. In this regard, microcredit offers hope in poverty alleviation and 
empowerment for the poorest of the poor. To do this, it should offer a 
diversified supply of products, meeting the full range of the poor’ needs 
(Thangamuthu, 2007). 
 
Gaining acceptance by organisations like the World Bank and the UNDP, 
nowadays microcredit institutions exist in almost every developing country. 
They directly contribute to the reduction of extreme poverty even in countries 
that suffer from macro-economic mismanagement and suffocating state 
bureaucracies. Leveraging on high reimbursement rates and a certain support 
from donor institutions, they have grown in number and in size reaching 
around 113 million of the poorest families, which in turn affect 410 million 
people around the world by the end of 2005 (Microcredit Summit 2006). 
 
What seemed a philanthropic dream of a handful of inspired leaders is 
becoming a structured industry that is fully aware of its sound economic 
                                                          
28 Microcredit Summit 2006, p. 3. 
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fundamentals and its distinctive competitive advantages (Microfinance 
Gateway, 2007). 
 
In microeconomic terms, microcredit overwhelms the problem of credit 
rationing to people excluded to banking services; it boosts the entrepreneurial 
initiatives in a plethora of directions, creating or strengthening micro-firms 
and family businesses, which in turn make the supply more reactive to local 
needs. This engenders a flow of new investment opportunities, in economic 
scales and thresholds compatible with the rural and urban environment. This 
increases the number of firms on many markets, boosting price and non-price 
competition.  
 
In macroeconomic terms, if strong enough, this dynamics could brake inflation 
due to excessive demand, reduce the growth of imports (and improve its 
capital component), broaden the tax base. In territorial terms, the localisation 
of MFIS across the country, and especially in rural areas, can reduce the 
unbalances between urban and rural areas and the necessity of emigration 
from the countryside. 
 
4.1. The diffusion of microcredit institutions in the world 
 
In recent years the world has witnessed a substantial surge in the diffusion of 
microcredit institutions particularly in the developing countries where many 
poor people make their living. Along with micro-credit facilities, they provide 
many functions to their clients such as training, motivation, organisation, and 
marketing outlets as a means of empowering the poor. According the 
Microcredit Summit 2006 as of the period ending 2005, 3,133 microcredit 
institutions reported reaching 113.2 million active clients29 (of which about 
82 million were the poorest at their first loan). 
 
The analysis that follows, however, is restricted to 54 countries encompassing 
420 microcredit institutions supporting 88 million clients, whose location and 
data have been specifically verified. 
 
With 59 microcredit institutions in the country, India tops the list of countries 
supporting the largest number of clients (amounting to 37 million), which 
represents 42% of the total. This is followed by Bangladesh, where in around 
25 million people are served by the existing 159 microcredit institutions that is 
the largest number in the world.  This means that many MFIs have flourished 
since the widely acclaimed Grameen Bank pioneered by Prof. Muhammad 
Yunus served as a stepping stone.  
 
A large number of these institutions are present in the South East Asia 
countries of Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines, Cambodia and Nepal. 
The potential of microcredit has not yet been fully exploited in Sub-Saharan 
countries, where acute poverty is prevalent: the number of MFIs in almost 
                                                          
29 State of Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2006 
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countries does not exceed 10 where the highly populated countries like 
Ethiopia and Nigeria have in the order of 8 and 4 MFIs, respectively, serving a 
total of around 1.8 million people. In view of the dire benefits from 
microfinance, this calls for concerted efforts to support governments in Sub-
Saharan Africa to increase the number of these institutions in order for them to 
reach the poorest section of their population.  
 
In all these institutions the increasing number of poorest30 clients - 
particularly women - benefiting from their services applies to all countries 
uniformly and this clearly exemplifies that are they are intended to reduce 
poverty in all countries thereby improving the standard living of these people. 
This is in tune with several goals of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs).  
 
The distribution of microcredit institutions in the structure of the world as 
mentioned in section 1 of this paper is given in the following table31: 
 
 No. of  MFIs Total Active Clients Poorest Clients 
    
Core 5 139,654 104,358 
Semi-periphery 64 37,738,266 30,425,828 
Periphery 138 22,134,449 13,770,090 
Independence 162 25,299,553 22,512,890 
 
The number of MFIs rises the lower the ranking the world hierarchy, with a 
huge number of MFIs in the independence area, which, summed up to the 
periphery, make larger numbers of clients than the semi-periphery32. 
 
Microcredit Institutions by total active clients (as of December 31, 2005) 
Country No. of MFIs Total Active Clients  Poorest Clients 
India 59 37,400,853 30,231,105 
Bangladesh 159 25,245,664 22,494,088 
Indonesia 4 5,673,258 2,357,460 
Vietnam 6 5,444,906 1,849,423 
Thailand 1 5,069,184 5,069,184 
Ethiopia 8 1,263,409 1,197,203 
Nigeria 4 955,702 762,432 
Sri Lanka 5 932,787 840,277 
Philippines 23 698,656 604,602 
Cambodia 5 623,189 497,852 
Nepal 21 555,862 470,267 
Pakistan 10 345,259 290,536 
Togo 1 260,000 250,000 
                                                          
30 Here “poorest” refers to people living less than US$1 a day, as per WB definitions.  
31 35 countries included in the analysis. If the paper is accepted, this number could rise. 
32 It is possible that the core is under-estimated because of methodological reasons. 
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Bolivia 6 248,699 162,127 
Egypt 5 246,139 149,632 
Morocco 4 234,120 110,818 
Malawi 4 233,664 117,846 
Mali 2 231,084 228,826 
Colombia 6 229,280 117,999 
Nicaragua 7 227,938 124,610 
Mexico 3 181,757 136,046 
Myanmar 3 157,416 151,960 
Senegal 3 156,231 129,114 
Burkina Faso 2 140,544 63,686 
P.R. of China 5 139,654 104,358 
Benin 3 122,825 29,687 
Malaysia 1 120,602 36,180 
The Gambia 2 113,249 73,887 
Tanzania 2 105,912 52,633 
Guinea 2 101,974 77,884 
Honduras 6 87,340 62,950 
Ecuador 3 85,636 25,720 
Guatemala 3 76,463 23,903 
Afghanistan 2 65,121 58,592 
Ghana 3 64,149 54,003 
Peru 3 56,536 34,043 
Uganda 3 53,889 18,802 
Mongolia 1 50,101 13,823 
Haiti 3 47,964 32,688 
Cameroon 2 41,089 29,000 
South Africa 1 35,054 22,497 
Kenya 1 31,110 25,000 
Azerbaijan 1 28,872 1,155 
Burundi 1 27,210 3,265 
Kyrgyzstan 1 26,217 5,243 
Tunisia 1 25,018 8,500 
Cote d'Ivoire 1 20,819 16,936 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
1 20,399 8,071 
Zambia 2 19,997 8,064 
Zimbabwe 3 19,672 11,263 
El Salvador 3 19,383 7,274 
Swaziland 1 18,300 10,000 
D.R. of Congo 1 16,013 2,722 
R. of Georgia 1 15,607 780 
Uzbekistan 1 9,943 696 
Paraguay 1 9,297 7,437 
Kosovo 1 4,801 816 
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Sudan 1 3,551 3,190 
Panama 1 2,944 2,500 
Namibia 1 2,286 1,500 
Total 420 88,444,598 69,282,155 
Source: our elaboration of the data available in Harris, 2006. 
 
4.2. The compatibility of key tenets of microcredit and remittances  
 
The mechanisms of microcredit and remittances are highly compatible as they 
share: 
 
the reliance on private initiative; 
the aim of improving material and moral well-being of the target group; 
the target group; 
the standard dimension  of transaction; 
the frequency and the time horizon of the payments. 
 
Both express a helpful hand to private initiatives of people that have decided 
to accept the most ambitious challenge in their life: they want to dramatically 
increase their competencies and economic activities in order to give their 
family a future; accordingly they are eager to deserve the trust they feel being 
the base of the monetary flow. 
 
In particular, six features are particularly important for the success of 
microcredit: 
 
the borrowers are raising from the ranks of the most active among the poor; 
loans are people that want to demonstrate that they deserve the trust they 
received by paying back entirely the capital and interests, so to be eligible in 
the future to further loans; 
the absolute amounts of loans are extremely low (tens or hundreds of dollars); 
reimbursement is made by frequent partial sums, whose timing allow for 
immediate action in case of difficulties; 
the extremely large number of loan receivers stabilises the reimbursement 
ratio around the average; 
the loan are granted for a short period of time. 
 
Microcredit institutions mainly lend absolutely small amounts, which however 
represent a quantum leap for the economic activities of artisans, urban and 
rural labourers, the poor with an entrepreneurial idea. These loans are 
immediately used for purchasing durable and capital goods, widens the 
business cash flow, triggering the attainment of the minimal efficient threshold 
of simple production processes. 
 
The informal capability of the poor are creatively used together with this small 
capital, giving rise to a locally high return to small investment because of 1. 
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the extraordinary inefficient of sub-capitalised production33, 2. the increase in 
the appropriation rate in value added due to the elimination of the usurer or of 
the owner of a durable needed for production34. 
 
The short period in which a loan is repaid help the receiver in focalising a 
specific action that brings immediate results, reducing the risks connected with 
long term planning in a highly precarious environment. On the other hand, 
MFIs can quickly rotate the money to further clients, because of the short 
period of the loan. 
 
All these feature sum up to assure a high reimbursement rate and high 
rentability of MFIs. 
 
Quite similarly, for remittances: 
 
the migrants are among the most entrepreneurial people; 
remittances are sent out of trust and a perspective of a common future; 
the amount sent is extremely low (again tens or hundreds of dollars); 
the payments are fairly frequent, supporting the receivers for a short period of 
time. 
 
The target group of MFI loans could well encompass the receivers of 
remittances and the reverse. The broad goals for both transfer of money is 
similar – from the point of view of the sender / MFI respectively – with MFIs 
having developed effective mechanism for controlling moral hazard and 
imperfect information. 
 
In historical terms, both MFIs and money transfer agencies started far from the 
standard banking practice to meet the special needs of the poor. The heavily 
structured, highly formalised banking sector was opposing a full range of 
barriers to simple micro-transactions by analphabetic people accustomed to 
informality; the new institutions offered the proper environment for the 
flourishing of entrepreneurial expression of the poor35.  
 
5. Connecting remittances to microcredit institutions 
 
Tackling the issue of how to connect MFIs to remittances flows requires a 
gradual approach, to orderly consider the opportunities, the difficulties and the 
remedies to difficulties.  
 
We shall first introduce a somewhat idealised example of how it could work. 
Then we generalise the example by showing the strands of alternatives to it. 
                                                          
33 Think to the purchase of a plough and an ox instead of using a hoe. 
34 The shoeblack, who pays half of its daily earning to the owner of the shoe brush, thanks to a 
loan that allows him to buy the brush, will immediately earn the double each day. 
35 To some extent, nowadays banks are trying to answer the competitive challenge in a pro-
active way. 
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Thirdly, we enlist the difficulties and, finally, we outline several strategies and 
recommendations to cope with them. 
 
After this, we summarise a map of potential targets within emigrants' types, 
assessing in a very preliminary way which might be the easiest and more 
promising sub-groups for this connection (remittances-microcredit). 
 
To identify priority countries where there is more probability of success, a 
simple quantitative analysis is carried out. 
 
The basic idea is that there exists a small but growing sub-group of emigrants 
that could devote significant sums to fund microcredit institutions, boosting 
the width and depth of microcredit penetration to help eradicating poverty. 
 
5.1.1. An example  
 
Let's imagine a husband working abroad remitting money to a wife with one 
child who lives in his country of origin. He arrived in the new country about 
one year and half ago and now begins to earn enough to pay for a barely 
subsistence life and save 150 US dollars to send home each month. Because of 
high fees in money transfer agency, he prefers to send money each two 
months. The wife relies on this money for a substantial part of living 
expenditure. She cares about herself and the child, pay for the house and do 
some limited informal paid activities to have some more money, especially 
useful when remittances are late. 
 
Their situation seems sustainable but any negative shock (e.g. he loses his job 
or finds a new emotional relation in the new country) would have immediate 
painful consequences. If everything goes well, he hopes to come back, 
although it’s implicit that in so doing he would lose the job and the pay. He 
would come back without any accumulated capital, because he sends home all 
his savings. 
 
This family might be interested in a proposal by a microcredit institution to 
provide a loan to the wife so that she can transform her informal paid activities 
in something more structured and rentable. Probably she will need to leave the 
child to a relative or a friend during the day. The money that microcredit 
institution lends might come from the same remittances that the husband 
sends, with some delay (i.e. she first gets the loan and becomes self-sufficient, 
than the remittance flows begin to be diverted from the family to the 
microcredit institution). 
 
Because of her new full-fledged entrepreneurial activity she does not rely any 
more on remittances for basic living. In turn, he mainly sends money to the 
MFI, although in special occasions he does still make presents. After a couple 
of years, he decides to come back: the MFI gives him back the money with 
interests; he joins the wife in her activity with this new capital and with all the 
skills that he developed abroad. 
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To this basic scenario, one can add a few details. The remittances sent to MFI 
might have been sufficient over time to cover loans also to many people other 
than wife alone, for instance the same relatives and friends that took care of 
the child. These people would now have some business activities, to the effect 
that there might be co-operation among all these units, in a sort of new-
Marshallian industrial district (or a tourist district). 
 
By sending to MFI, the husband gains transparency over uses of his money, 
which cumulates for his future, not being opaquely used for consumption.  
 
In case this family breaks down, for any reasons, both would fall on their feet, 
at least from an economic point of view. However, this risk is diminished by 
the short-term and realistic perspective of return to home. 
 
The key point was the mobilisation of wife’s time from housekeeping to 
business, by changing the proportions that these two elements had in her life. 
She has been associated in the work &save effort of the husband, instead of 
complementing his effort exclusively with consumption & care.  
 
The sender has the incentive to send more money, because it will have it back 
with interests. The entire family boosts its own business, acquiring new 
competencies and higher income; even more importantly, the mentality of 
relying on others assumes an entrepreneurial attitude.  
 
The diaspora is often an extremely active supplier of Foreign Direct 
Investments, since “as a result of the skills acquired in their host country, 
migrants are often capable of discovering new markets that have not been 
identified by foreign investors because they have a better knowledge of the 
context and environment of their country of origin”  (Sakadi, 2006). 
 
For the country receiving remittances, it means real endogenous development, 
not just consumption, imports, and rise of house prices. Potential GDP rises 
because of new entrepreneurial initiative, with a better balance between the 
rise in aggregate demand (due to remittances used for consumption) and 
aggregate supply. 
 
5.1.2. Some alternatives 
 
This story can be changed in many different ways. Emigrants of both genders 
can send money to MFIs, indicating a range of microcredit recipients that 
encompasses the spouse, the relatives, the friends, the local community. The 
proportion of the remittance which is diverted to MFIs can be extremely small 
or reach the entire remittance amount. There can be a framework agreement 
between the MFI and the sender for certain levels over time or be just an 
account in which she/he sends when and what she/he can. 
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The payment back to the migrant from the MFI might be unconditional or 
subject to constraints, a-vista or with a delay, in a lump-sum or as a strand of 
small amounts; the interest rate be fixed or used as incentive. 
 
In short, the quadrilateral relationship among the remittance sender, MFI, loan 
receiver and remittance receiver can be extremely different from one case to 
another. 
 
5.2.1. The difficulties 
 
From the point of view of MFIs, the connection with a remittance flow can be 
difficult, undesirable or impossible because of these main reasons: 
 
the legal environment forbids it or make it so onerous that in practice it’s 
unfeasible; 
the risk of collecting money may be considered too high; 
the skills and the organisational structure of MFI are completely devoted to 
loan receiver, without anybody in charge to individual creditor; 
financial markets do already offer large bulk of financial means to MFI at 
cheaper rates; 
the banks are afraid of the competition over money gathering, so their 
lobbying power effectively prevents this operation. 
 
From the point of view of the remittance recipients, there may be 
unwillingness to renounce to an easier flow of unredeemable remittance in 
exchange for a loan that has to be paid back. 
 
5.2.2. The remedies 
 
The difficulties in connecting remittances to microcredit should be addressed 
with graduality in terms of the approach process and radicality in the final 
result.  
The difficulties that arise for the MFI might be reduced or eliminated taking 
into account the following factors: 
 
the relevant legal environment is that of the country where MFI would offer 
the credit; it lies in its very interest to allow MFIs operate as fully as possible 
to reduce/eradicate poverty; this market should be liberalised in gradual and 
sustainable way, allowing for the institutional building phase of a regulator 
and a set of intermediaries (e.g. for guarantees); a simplification of procedures 
can be granted to MFIs that respect strict guidelines of transparency and 
acceptable risk-taking; meanwhile, it should be noted that the connection 
considered in this paper is independent from MFI directly operating as money 
transfer agency; 
a cap to the percentage of funds deriving from individual money raising might 
be imposed, by the regulator or internally by the same MFI, to keep into 
account the possibility of a “run to the bank” where remittance senders would 
like to have their money back all at the same time; the conditions offered to 
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them might include exact clauses which make this highly unlikely36 and a 
guarantee might be obtained by third-party institutions; note that money 
collection is made in the final recipient country, in its currency, without 
exchange rate risk (for MFI); moreover, the sum collected from each 
individual are extremely small and they can be easily recovered from the 
rotating funds of MFI. The good governance of MFI, its credibility and 
transparency are clearly pre-conditions; 
apart from the detailed legal interface governing the relationships with 
remittance sender, MFI does not need any particular skill or structure abroad 
to manage this relation: it’s just a inflow of money, where the ordinary bank 
facilities connected with accounts (face-to-face premises, automatic teller 
machines,...) are not offered; note again that this in contrast with the highly 
demanding challenge in the case MFI would try to compete with money 
transfer agencies37;this flow from remittances does not prevent MFI other 
sources of funds; rather it diversifies the sources, which gain a new plethora of 
creditors each for a small amount; banks in sender countries are just beginning 
to be interested in remittances flows, because the sums are often extremely 
small and too costly to manage, as well as in microcredit operations in 
recipient countries (for the same reasons): a client that puts in an account some 
dozens of dollars each month without asking any service is of almost no use to 
banks. 
 
In all this, the gradual experimentation by MFIs and regulators will give 
insights over the best ways to cope with difficulties, taking lessons from the 
experiences of banks and microfinancial institutions. 
 
As for the remittance receivers, they would be engaged in this mechanism if 
they perceive the potential of mobilisation of their entrepreneurial capabilities, 
especially if the time path of loans and repayments is such that they receive at 
the beginning a fairly high sum (higher than the remittance) and they have a 
realistic way to make a solid business out of it. This approach should be 
balanced with the interest of MFI in being a net receiver from this operation, 
not a net financial backer. Depending on the current structure of MFI assets, 
the proposal to remittance receivers can be more or less aggressive38. 
 
5.3. The expected sensitivity of different kinds of emigrants 
 
Migrants are highly heterogeneous in terms of the (push and pull) reasons of 
migration, of the level of incomes reached in the host country and previously 
perceived in the country of origin, of backward and forward family linkages, 
of the expected time (short / long) horizon of migration (reversible / 
                                                          
36 A strict rule might be that the remittance sender can receive his/her money back only if 
returning home and as a flow of small payments, unless he/she declares in sufficient advance 
this decision.  
37 Hastings, 2006. 
38 Since there is some scattered evidence of a fall in remittances when the receiver asks for a 
microcredit (Pitt et al. 2003), possibly because the remittant sender feels that the receiver 
affords this, the proposed device might be powerful in “luring” the sender to continue to send. 
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irreversible), of frequency and dimension of remittances (in absolute terms 
and in share of income).  
 
These elements also change over time: a migrant who does not usually send 
home money might be forced to by an unexpected difficulty in the family of 
origin. 
 
Correspondingly, migrants will react differently to the MFIs proposal of 
borrowing money from them. Noting that even extremely small amounts 
would still be welcomed, the crucial point is the possibility of diverting money 
from current recipients or to increase the total money sent. The first point 
might link to an improved situation in recipients; the second is due to the 
personal interest of the sender to recover these amounts with interests, while 
coming back. 
 
The single most important factor is, however, the time horizon of potential 
return home: if it is realistically short, the proposal will be particularly 
welcomed, whereas an irreversible migration, possibly attracting other 
members of the family abroad, makes the proposal much less attractive. 
 
Accordingly, the first cluster of potential lender is constituted by singles that 
have emigrated but who do not like, or not able, to integrate fully in the new 
country: they are making sacrifices for themselves but have reasons to reject 
the new country and would like to come back with a capital (of skills and 
money). Note that this group might currently not be sending remittances at all. 
 
The second cluster is constituted by spouses that deeply feel the lack of the 
partner and would like to come back as soon as possible, whereas “possible” 
means the economic sustainability of the re-unified family: this was our basic 
case in the previous chapter. This group represents the bulk of current 
remittances: “The workers likely to send home the highest proportion of their 
income are contract and other temporary workers mostly who know they are 
returning home. Those who stay abroad longer, and particularly those who 
have dependants with them, are less likely to send money home. And as they 
take up residence in their new communities, the payments for siblings come 
even small and more irregular” (Tewolde B., 2005, p. 26) 
 
The third cluster perceive the remittance receiving country as economically 
emerging, in a booming phase in which it would be right to invest. It could 
even be formed by second or third generation who suffer from discrimination 
and social isolation, whereas the education received would be well-rated in the 
emerging country. Again, this group is usually not currently sending 
remittances. “ A fairly common pattern is for temporary migrants to send 
larger shares of their income home, often up to half, whereas longer term 
migrants and follow-on generations tend to send less” (Sander and Maimbo, 
2003, p. 16). 
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In countries where microcredit is well-known, MFIs can respond to the 
growing demand for loans by inducing the pressure of potential borrowers 
towards the migrants they are in contact with.  
 
5.4. Priority countries 
 
Where the proposed policy has the largest potential for success? Much will 
depend on cultural background and visionary leaders – both in the private and 
in the public sector. However, the overall quantities of remittances and active 
MFIs client base can be used as proxy for the achieved experience of the MFIs 
and of the target groups. 
 
In this vein, a graph of the dimensions of overall inflows of remittances (Y 
axis) and active client base (X axis) is offered here39: 
In the upper part of the graph, you’ll find the countries with large remittances 
flows, whereas on the right part the countries with large microcredit client 
base. In a mature situation, India and Bangladesh have both, with Vietnam, 
Indonesia and Thailand just behind. Ethiopia is also another country where 
there is a large potential, together with Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines.  
 
China and Mexico are large recipients of remittances but microcredit is 
lagging behind: in these countries the linkage might be particularly promising, 
although MFI sector may be still not too ready40. 
                                                          
























6. Concluding remarks 
 
Remittances are a powerful and rising financial force reshaping the world 
structure. Their micro-foundation lies in economic, behavioural, and 
psychological relationships burdened by imperfect information and moral 
hazard. By reducing these imperfections, an increase in the absolute level of 
remittances and an improvement in the way they are used could be reached by 
an appealing proposal by microcredit financial institution to accept shares of 
remittances flows, using them to make loans to the poor, and paying back to 
remittance senders when they come back home.  
 
The loans would boost entrepreneurship and would widen the domestic supply 
of goods and services, reducing the tensions and unbalances due to remittances 
(inflation, trade deficit, asset price bubbles and so forth).  
 
This mechanism, fully addressing the pro-poor impact of remittances in 
developing countries and improving services to migrants, will have a 
significant impact on poverty reduction and stimulate growth in those 
countries. 
 
Official assistance agencies might help this process, so as to boost the 
sustainability of the strategies aimed at reducing/eradicating poverty. 
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Appendix I - The pattern approach 
 
 
The “pattern approach” attribute bilateral relationships across all countries in 
the world to an exhaustive list of 16 possible different types (Piana, 2004; 
Piana, 2006). 
 
The categories are based on the intuition of taking full advantage of the 
information that transactions reveal about the reciprocal importance two 
agents attach to each other. The issue of “reciprocity” is crucial because 
“globalization is a process leading to greater interdependence and mutual 
awareness (reflexivity) among economic, political, and social units in the 
world, and among actors in general”41. The transactions used in this 
determination are trade transaction of import and exports, the basic connection 
among national economies. In formal terms, the 16 categories are generated by 
including all possible combinations of four independent status flags: 
 
1. “For B, A is a major export destination” 
 
2. “For B, A is a major import source” 
 
3. “For A, B is a major export destination” 
 
4. “For A, B is a major import source”. 
 
 
These propositions are logically independent, as each one can be true or false 
independent of the value of the others. 
 
For each proposition, we build a binary variable that will take the value of 1 if 
the proposition is true and zero in the opposite case. 
 
The “binary description” of a two-country “pattern” is obtained simply by 
putting the four binary variables one after another, in the same order as we 
presented them. For instance the “binary description” 1100 means that, for B, 
A is both a major export destination and a major import source while, for A, B 
isn't important. We shall call this relationship the “dominance” of A over B. 
 





Qualitative description Examples 
Absence of 
relationships 
0000 The countries "ignore" each 
other 
Australia-Andorra 
Source dependence 0001 B is an important provider Ecuador-
                                                          
41 Guilleñ (2001). 
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Dependence 0011 B is very important to A, but 
the reverse is not true 
Philippines-USA; 
India-UK 
Source dominance 0100 A is an important provider of 




Source integration 0101 They both need each other as 
providers 
No real world 




0110 One flow is important for 
both: the exports of A to B 
Saudi Arabia-Rep. 




0111 A depends on B, but B needs 





1000 A is an important destination 





1001 One flow is important for 














1011 A depends on B, but B needs 
A only as a destination 
Ecuador-Colombia, 
Belgium-Germany 
Dominance 1100 A is very important to B and 





1101 A is very important to B but 







1110 A is very important to B but 










To be considered a “major” import or export partner, the country has to belong 
to the top 5 partners of the other.  
 
The method requires a very basic data about each included country: the list of 
its top 5 source of imports and the list of its top 5 destination of export. The 
order in the list is irrelevant. Exact totals are not needed.  
 
                                                          
42 Only in 2003. In 1998 there are no examples of this pattern. 
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This makes the category quite robust, since rankings are much less sensitive to 
minor fluctuations, statistical errors, exceptional transactions, discrepancies 
between importer and exporter declarations, etc. 
 
The robustness of the analysis to changes in the number of top partners, as 
well as other methodological issues, are discussed in Piana, 2006. 
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Appendix II - The list of country attribution to world regions 
 
Name Region in 1998 Region in 2003 Code 
Albania PERIPHERY PERIPHERY ALB 
Algeria PERIPHERY PERIPHERY ALG 
Argentina SEMI-PERIPHERY SEMI-PERIPHERY ARG 
Australia SEMI-PERIPHERY SEMI-PERIPHERY AUS 
Austria SEMI-PERIPHERY SEMI-PERIPHERY AUT 
Azerbaijan PERIPHERY PERIPHERY AZE 
Bangladesh INDEPENDENCE INDEPENDENCE BGD 
Belarus SEMI-PERIPHERY SEMI-PERIPHERY BLR 
Belgium SEMI-PERIPHERY CORE BEL 
Bolivia PERIPHERY PERIPHERY BOL 
Brazil SEMI-PERIPHERY SEMI-PERIPHERY BRA 
Bulgaria PERIPHERY PERIPHERY BGR 
Cameroon PERIPHERY PERIPHERY CMR 
Canada PERIPHERY PERIPHERY CAN 
Chile PERIPHERY PERIPHERY CHL 
China CORE CORE CHN 
Colombia PERIPHERY PERIPHERY COL 
Costa Rica SEMI-PERIPHERY SEMI-PERIPHERY CRI 
Croatia PERIPHERY PERIPHERY CRO 
Cyprus PERIPHERY PERIPHERY CYP 
Czech Rep. PERIPHERY PERIPHERY CZE 
Denmark SEMI-PERIPHERY SEMI-PERIPHERY DNK 
Ecuador SEMI-PERIPHERY PERIPHERY ECU 
Egypt PERIPHERY PERIPHERY EGY 
Estonia PERIPHERY PERIPHERY EST 
Ethiopia PERIPHERY PERIPHERY ETH 
Finland SEMI-PERIPHERY SEMI-PERIPHERY FIN 
France SEMI-PERIPHERY CORE FRA 
Germany CORE CORE GER 
Greece SEMI-PERIPHERY SEMI-PERIPHERY GRC 
Guatemala PERIPHERY PERIPHERY GTM 
Honduras PERIPHERY PERIPHERY HND 
Hungary PERIPHERY PERIPHERY HUN 
Iceland PERIPHERY PERIPHERY ICE 
India SEMI-PERIPHERY SEMI-PERIPHERY IND 
Indonesia PERIPHERY PERIPHERY IDN 
Iran SEMI-PERIPHERY PERIPHERY IRN 
Ireland PERIPHERY PERIPHERY IRL 
Israel PERIPHERY PERIPHERY ISR 
Italy SEMI-PERIPHERY SEMI-PERIPHERY ITA 
Ivory Coast PERIPHERY PERIPHERY IVO 
Japan CORE CORE JPN 
Jordan PERIPHERY PERIPHERY JOR 
Kenya PERIPHERY PERIPHERY KEN 
Kyrgyzstan PERIPHERY PERIPHERY KGZ 
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Latvia PERIPHERY PERIPHERY LVA 
Lebanon PERIPHERY PERIPHERY LBN 
Lithuania PERIPHERY PERIPHERY LTU 
Name Region in 1998 Region in 2003 Code 
Madagascar PERIPHERY PERIPHERY MDG 
Malawi PERIPHERY PERIPHERY MWI 
Malaysia SEMI-PERIPHERY SEMI-PERIPHERY MYS 
Maldives PERIPHERY PERIPHERY MDV 
Malta PERIPHERY PERIPHERY MLT 
Mauritius PERIPHERY PERIPHERY MUS 
Mexico PERIPHERY SEMI-PERIPHERY MEX 
Mongolia PERIPHERY PERIPHERY MNG 
Morocco PERIPHERY PERIPHERY MOR 
Nepal PERIPHERY PERIPHERY NPL 
Netherlands PERIPHERY PERIPHERY NTH 
New Zealand PERIPHERY PERIPHERY NZL 
Nicaragua PERIPHERY PERIPHERY NIC 
Nigeria PERIPHERY PERIPHERY NGA 
Norway PERIPHERY PERIPHERY NOR 
Oman PERIPHERY PERIPHERY OMN 
Pakistan PERIPHERY PERIPHERY PAK 
Panama PERIPHERY PERIPHERY PAN 
Papua New Guinea PERIPHERY PERIPHERY PNG 
Peru PERIPHERY PERIPHERY PER 
Philippines PERIPHERY PERIPHERY PHL 
Poland SEMI-PERIPHERY SEMI-PERIPHERY POL 
Portugal PERIPHERY PERIPHERY PRT 
Qatar PERIPHERY PERIPHERY QAT 
Rep. of Korea SEMI-PERIPHERY PERIPHERY KOR 
Rep. of Moldova PERIPHERY PERIPHERY MDA 
Romania SEMI-PERIPHERY SEMI-PERIPHERY ROM 
Russian Federation SEMI-PERIPHERY SEMI-PERIPHERY RUS 
Saudi Arabia SEMI-PERIPHERY SEMI-PERIPHERY SAU 
Senegal PERIPHERY PERIPHERY SEN 
Singapore SEMI-PERIPHERY SEMI-PERIPHERY SGP 
Slovakia PERIPHERY PERIPHERY SVK 
Slovenia PERIPHERY PERIPHERY SVN 
South Africa SEMI-PERIPHERY SEMI-PERIPHERY SAF 
Spain SEMI-PERIPHERY SEMI-PERIPHERY SPA 
Sweden SEMI-PERIPHERY SEMI-PERIPHERY SWE 
Switzerland SEMI-PERIPHERY SEMI-PERIPHERY SWI 
Thailand PERIPHERY PERIPHERY THA 
Tunisia PERIPHERY PERIPHERY TUN 
Turkey SEMI-PERIPHERY SEMI-PERIPHERY TUR 
Uganda INDEPENDENCE INDEPENDENCE UGA 
United Kingdom CORE SEMI-PERIPHERY GBR 
Uruguay PERIPHERY PERIPHERY URY 
USA CORE CORE USA 
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Venezuela PERIPHERY PERIPHERY VEN 
Viet Nam PERIPHERY PERIPHERY VNM 
Zambia PERIPHERY PERIPHERY ZMB 
 
 
 
 
